Forms of life in the Philosophical Investigations

In this essay I try to briefly examine the conception of forms of life as used by Wittgenstein in the first part of his Philosophical Investigations (from now on, PI). In total, there are three explicit mentions of the concept along the text. The first one occurs in §19, the second one right after the previous one in §23, and the third and last one in §241.

§19

The first mention of forms of life is introduced right as when Wittgenstein returns to a language-game imagined before. In §2, the author describes a language-game which corresponds to the Augustinian understanding of language being taught ostensibly, i.e., by the pointing out of examples — a person says word X out loud and points to object A to mean that X is the name of A: a person says “book” and points to a book somewhere.

The situation for the language-game based on Augustine and imagined by Wittgenstein is then explained in the following manner: there are two people building things together, a builder and their assistant, and they use a primitive language to communicate what should be done. The builder asks for a block or for a slab and the assistant brings the mentioned object. In English, this would commonly be done by way of questions (“Can you please bring me a block?”) or orders (“Bring me a block!”) in a relatively complex fashion since it involves verbs, substantives, and a whole syntax. But in the language-game Wittgenstein proposes this is done just by the enunciation of the word associated with the desired object. So, instead of “bring me a block”, it is simply “block”, and the assistant does as he is told (Wittgenstein 1958, 3).

Before returning to this situation in §19, however, Wittgenstein chooses to preface it with the first mention of the form of life. He writes:

It is easy to imagine a language consisting only of orders and reports in battle.—Or a language consisting only of questions and expressions for answering yes and no. And innumerable others.—And to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life (Wittgenstein 1958, 8).

All over the PI we encounter these hypotheses: “given these rules, how would a corresponding language-game function?” while the author constructs his arguments based on them or reflects upon their consequences. So what would it mean to affirm that to imagine a language is to imagine a form of life? Of course, and firstly, it is undeniable that Wittgenstein is proposing a direct connection between language-games and forms of life. When you have one, you have the other as well. And it seems like the priority given in this relationship to the language-game is important, that of a causal relation between one and the other: forms of life → language-games — in the singular version:  form of life X → language-game X.

Any form of life can be seen then as limited by its corresponding language-game, a thought Wittgenstein sketches previously in the only book he published in life: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP). While it is known the author’s philosophical standing changed over time, with this being treated commonly as a ‘break’ between the early and the later Wittgenstein, here we find a point of convergence.

 In §5.6 of the TLP, Wittgenstein affirms that the limits of one’s language means the limits of one’s world. The choice of using the verb ‘mean’ instead of the verb ‘are’ is not important, I think. At first glance, it could be important if Wittgenstein desired to make a distinction between them; but as we continue reading we quickly understand that he uses meaning as a synonym to being: in §5.61 he reverses the previous relation and argues that the limits of the world are also the limits of logic. There is a deeply thoughtful argument that Wittgenstein provides at this moment. Since “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” and “the limits of the world are also its [logic’s] limits”, there is no way for logic to account for absences in the world (Wittgenstein 1994, 245).

If we have a language X with a world X and a language Y with a world Y, each logic can affirm what exists in their corresponding world, that is, for language X it’s possible to say “such and such exists” in X and the same is valid for Y. Now let’s suppose that an object Z exists in world Z and in both X and Y worlds. It’s possible to say then that “Z exists” in X, Y, and Z. The problem is that these possibilities end there. It’s not possible in the world X, Y, or Z to say what there is not. “There is not ɑ in X” or “There is not β in Y” is nonsense since the language is limited by what there is in the world and what there is in the world cannot fully tell us what there is not. If language could surpass the limits of the world it would surpass its own limits. The conclusion is that in this case there wouldn’t be a coherent way to even define such limits let alone understand them. It does not matter here, however, the soundness of this argument since the importance of it resides in being a species of precursor to what Wittgenstein says later.

Over the next subsection, that is, §5.62, Wittgenstein makes it clear what he meant by arguing via an emphasis of the possessive determiner “my” in the sentence “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world”. Consequently, the world in general is not equal to my or your or their world and the same goes for language. There are, of course, intersections but there are also exclusivities in this case. This is even more explicit in §5.621: “The world and life are one” (Wittgenstein 1994, 245).

§23

The second mention of forms of life occurs in §23 of the PI while Wittgenstein is stating briefly the relation between form of life and language-game: “Here the term ‘language-game’ is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life” (Wittgenstein 1958, 11). In short, the language-game is always inscribed within a form of life, transforming the possibility of a language-game originating a form of life a difficult one to argue via Wittgenstein.

Quite on the contrary. It’s not easy to think of a language appearing before its related social practice. How would a form of communication arise without rooting itself in a series of repetitive actions and roles shared between a group of people? In this case, if there is not a reunion of different beings of the same species preceding any kind of relation that could be called language, where would we find the need for communication? What would even be communicated? 

Instead, it’s relatively simple to think of language arising out of a social necessity. Maybe advising your next of kin to watch out for predators if they intend on hunting at night, expressing your disapproval about some specific action taken by them, or simply pointing out somewhere and vocalizing how beautiful the scenery looks. These examples vary regarding its degree of necessity; of course being attentive to predators is higher in any priority list than showing something beautiful, since running around in an unknown forest could be fatal. But they represent the truth of understanding forms of life as the true basis for language-games of any kind.

Through its amplitude, the concept of language-game can open up a discussion about how animals develop their own kind of communication because of the way they live. Even if there are quasi-universal signs of distress or fear shared by most living beings, the specifics of communication reside within each species. Later in the PI, we can see Wittgenstein concluding, after a string of arguments: “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (Wittgenstein 1958, 225). The short justification for this being that even if the lion could talk, he would talk in such a manner and about things so inseparable to his own form of life that there would be no possibility of humans understanding it. The only solution would be for humans and lions to start living together and creating a hybrid form of life and consequently a corresponding language-game.

Speaking about relations between species, I see the link between the concepts of life and language-game as possible enlighteners of what ecology calls biological interactions. More specifically, relations between two different species where both are benefited or where one is benefited and the other is not negatively affected, respectively mutualism and commensalism. 

The most cited example of mutualism is usually the interaction between the Egyptian plover (Pluvianus aegyptius) and crocodiles, in which the bird feeds on the meat between the crocodile’s teeth, although there is not a definite proof that this actually occurs¹. But on the level of exemplifying what I was talking about before, it could be argued that the only reason the plover dares to enter the crocodile’s mouth is because they sufficiently communicate — at least to guarantee it will not be eaten alive by the crocodile and the crocodile knows the bird is not going to harm the insides of its mouth. 

This, in turn, is only possible if they share a common form of life. Clearly a bird and a crocodile don’t share the same form of life in a strict sense. However, they share some common characteristics, for example, being capable of eating meat. And also they inhabit the same region of the Nile valley, which offers at least some interactive security. If the bird flew over to an unknown location, far away from where it usually lives, and found another kind of crocodile, we can see how this would change its relationship with the crocodiles there. Either the plover would be eaten or it would not even dare to interact with the crocodiles.

§241 

The third explicit mention of form of life is found in §241. Since it’s short here it is in full: 

‘So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?’—It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life (Wittgenstein 1958, 88).

Wittgenstein basically states that we cannot use true or false in regards to language. Instead, languages are agreed upon by two or more people to say statements that can be true or false — and also to consequently note that “this statement is false” or the opposite. The form of life two or more subjects share is responsible for the communication that happens between them, which is expected since we already know that forms of life ‘determine’ language.

Such a view explains why it is so difficult to discuss with someone with completely different definitions than ourselves. To debate about feudalism in 14th century France, for example, there needs to be a previous agreement as to what feudalism is or at least that feudalism as a concept is valid. This is a presupposition of the debate, it’s already taken for granted. It would make no sense to put together one person arguing that feudalism is a viable way to understand what happened in the final stage of the medieval age and another that said that feudalism is not a proper analytical concept, unless the debate is about feudalism itself.

Besides this, the mentioned previous agreement impedes ambiguity. “Capitalism originated in Mesopotamia” can be true if capitalism is understood as commerce but any historian could see the dangers of understanding capitalism there as meaning the social system or mode of production that is considered to have begun in Europe after the medieval ages, since doing so would consequently naturalize it and so on. The result of this would be a major anachronism. The solution is simple: the author must in some way or another provide a definition or a brief description of what he understands as capitalism. Only then can the reader be certain of what he meant and whether the phrase is valid or not.

Bibliography

Herodotus. The Histories. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920. https://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:text:1999.01.0126 

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958.

Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. São Paulo: Edusp, 1994.

1. Herodotus is responsible for the first known description of the tale: “Since it lives in the water, its mouth is all full of leeches. All birds and beasts flee from it, except the sandpiper, with which it is at peace because this bird does the crocodile a service; for whenever the crocodile comes ashore out of the water and then opens its mouth (and it does this mostly to catch the west wind), the sandpiper goes into its mouth and eats the leeches; the crocodile is pleased by this service and does the sandpiper no harm.” (Herodotus 1920, 2.68.4-5)